interesting argument by Mahbubani, who I have read an follow for 15 years, about europe's strategic long term interest in developing and growing africa's economy through investment : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oUsA_ei_bWc
Yes — this is a very characteristic Mahbubani argument, and one that has actually become more strategically compelling over the last decade.
His core thesis is brutally simple:
Europe’s long-term stability depends less on containing Africa and more on helping Africa become prosperous.
And he frames this not as charity or post-colonial guilt, but as hard geopolitical self-interest.
What makes Mahbubani interesting is that he combines:
- demographics,
- migration,
- economics,
- geopolitics,
- and civilizational realism
into one coherent systems view.
The demographic arithmetic he points to is striking:
- Europe is aging and shrinking,
- Africa is young and rapidly growing,
- by 2100 Africa could have ~4 billion people versus a much smaller Europe.
His argument is that if African economies fail to industrialize and create jobs, migration pressure toward Europe becomes structurally unavoidable. Not because of ideology, but because of basic human incentives.
So from his perspective, Europe has two choices:
- Spend endlessly on border control, political crisis management, and internal polarization.
- Invest massively in African development so people can build prosperous lives locally.
He sees the second as vastly cheaper and more stable over a 30-50 year horizon.
What is especially provocative is his criticism of Europe’s stance toward Chinese investment in Africa. He argues Europe is strategically irrational when it opposes infrastructure and industrial investment there merely because it comes from China.
His logic is:
- if Chinese railways, ports, factories, energy systems, telecom infrastructure, etc. help create African middle classes,
- then Europe indirectly benefits through reduced instability and migration pressure.
That’s a very Singaporean / realist framing:
not “Who wins ideologically?”
but “What outcome stabilizes the system?”
There’s also a deeper layer underneath his thinking that many Europeans instinctively resist:
Mahbubani believes Europe still thinks too morally and too short-term about geopolitics, whereas rising Asian powers think in civilizational and demographic timescales.
You can disagree with parts of his geopolitical conclusions — especially his softer stance toward China or his criticism of EU alignment with the US — but the Africa point itself is difficult to dismiss.
In fact, even many mainstream European strategists increasingly accept versions of it:
- Mediterranean stability,
- African industrialization,
- energy partnerships,
- food security,
- local manufacturing,
- education and infrastructure investment
are becoming viewed as core European security policy, not merely development aid.
And there’s another uncomfortable truth embedded in his argument:
Europe historically extracted enormous value from Africa during the colonial era, but invested comparatively little in creating diversified local industrial economies afterward. Mahbubani essentially argues that Europe now faces the long delayed geopolitical consequences of that imbalance.
What makes him compelling is that he avoids moralism. He says, essentially:
“Forget morality for a second. Purely from selfish strategic logic, Europe should want Africa to succeed.”
That’s why his arguments resonate across ideological lines:
- conservatives hear “prevent destabilizing migration,”
- liberals hear “invest in development,”
- business leaders hear “future growth markets,”
- strategists hear “long-term regional stability.”
And honestly, from Belgium specifically, you can already see hints of this future:
- labor shortages,
- aging demographics,
- political stress around migration,
- increasing economic integration with African diasporas,
- and growing recognition that the Mediterranean and Sahel are not “foreign problems” anymore.
Mahbubani’s larger point is that Europe’s future may depend less on managing decline internally and more on whether it helps shape prosperity in the neighboring continent with the world’s youngest population.
That may be the central tragedy of the situation.
Mahbubani’s proposal requires a civilization that can think:
- strategically,
- collectively,
- and across generations.
But contemporary European politics often operates:
- electorally,
- emotionally,
- reactively,
- and on very short time horizons.
And populism thrives precisely because the benefits of long-term strategy are diffuse and delayed, while the costs are immediate and visible.
A populist can always say:
“Why are we spending billions in Africa while our own citizens struggle with housing, healthcare, pensions, and energy bills?”
That argument is politically powerful because it appeals to something intuitive and emotionally legitimate:
people expect governments to prioritize their own citizens first.
The problem is that geopolitics often punishes short-term intuitions.
Because the uncomfortable strategic reality may be:
- if Europe does not invest externally,
- internal pressures may become even more expensive later.
But that causal chain is hard to communicate democratically.
It’s much easier politically to point at:
- a foreign aid package,
- an infrastructure project in Kenya,
- or investments in Senegal,
than to explain abstract future benefits like:
- reduced migration pressure in 2045,
- regional stabilization,
- future export markets,
- or geopolitical influence.
Humans — and democracies especially — discount the future heavily.
And Europe has another structural difficulty:
it is already internally strained.
Many Europeans feel their own societies are stagnating:
- housing shortages,
- aging infrastructure,
- declining public services,
- slow growth,
- loss of industrial competitiveness,
- cultural fragmentation,
- energy insecurity.
In that atmosphere, large external investments become politically fragile.
China in contrast industrialized and expanded outward while still possessing:
- strong growth,
- national confidence,
- and a collective narrative of ascent.
Europe often feels like a civilization managing relative decline.
That produces defensive politics.
And there’s a paradox here:
The more migration pressure and instability rise,
the harder it becomes politically to invest in long-term African development,
because voters become more anxious and inward-looking.
So Europe risks entering a vicious cycle:
- Underinvest in African development.
- Migration pressure rises.
- Political radicalization rises.
- Governments become more defensive and nationalistic.
- Long-term external investment becomes politically impossible.
- Instability worsens further.
Mahbubani’s fear — I think — is that Europe may intellectually understand the logic but lack the political cohesion and confidence to act on it until crisis forces action.
And historically, democracies often do delay strategic adaptation until pressure becomes acute.
Still, I wouldn’t become completely fatalistic.
Europe also has strengths that are easy to underestimate:
- enormous accumulated wealth,
- advanced technology,
- institutional depth,
- high educational levels,
- legal stability,
- soft power,
- and geographic proximity to Africa.
And demographic/economic reality may eventually force a strategic shift regardless of ideology.
For example:
- European companies will increasingly need African markets and labor,
- energy transition may tie Europe to North and West Africa,
- supply chains may regionalize,
- and migration management may gradually evolve from “border control only” toward “development and stabilization.”
The real question is whether Europe can make that transition proactively and intelligently —
or only chaotically after repeated crises.
Your concern about populist backlash is very realistic though.
Because once societies lose confidence in their future, long-term investment strategies become politically much harder to sustain.
In some ways this is ultimately a crisis of strategic imagination and collective confidence as much as economics.
I understand why you feel that tension. Many people look at Europe and see:
- immense capital,
- advanced technology,
- highly educated populations,
- and historically unprecedented wealth,
yet also a striking inability to coordinate around long-term civilizational goals.
Meanwhile China appears capable of:
- building infrastructure at massive scale,
- executing industrial policy,
- planning decades ahead,
- and aligning finance, state capacity, and national strategy.
That contrast can feel deeply frustrating.
But I would be careful about idealizing the Chinese model too much — not because the Western narrative is always fair, but because the tradeoffs are real even if they are less visible from afar.
China’s system undeniably has advantages for long-term execution:
- continuity of leadership,
- centralized coordination,
- fewer veto points,
- state-directed finance,
- suppression of short-term political obstruction,
- and the ability to mobilize national effort quickly.
That is extraordinarily effective for:
- railways,
- ports,
- industrialization,
- energy systems,
- manufacturing scaling,
- and geopolitical strategy.
Europe often looks paralyzed in comparison.
But the same mechanisms that enable strategic coherence also carry risks:
- weak public correction mechanisms,
- difficulty admitting policy failures,
- information filtering upward,
- local abuses of power,
- and suppression of dissent that may initially look “stabilizing” but can create hidden fragilities.
The question is not simply:
“Is censorship bad?”
The deeper question is:
“How does a society maintain feedback loops?”
Democracies are noisy, inefficient, and often strategically shortsighted.
But that messiness also allows self-correction and legitimacy.
China’s system is often more competent operationally — especially in infrastructure and industrial policy — but it depends heavily on the quality of elite decision-making at the top.
If the leadership is competent, results can be astonishing.
If major strategic mistakes occur, there are fewer mechanisms to challenge them openly.
Still, I think your broader frustration is less about authoritarianism itself and more about:
the inability of wealthy democracies to act collectively toward long-term common interests.
And that frustration is understandable.
Because increasingly many Europeans feel:
- financial capital is detached from societal needs,
- investment flows toward speculative returns,
- public infrastructure decays,
- strategic industries weaken,
- and politics cannot coordinate meaningful long-term action.
So wealth accumulates, but collective capability weakens.
And yes, a great deal of European capital ends up flowing into:
- US tech giants,
- global financial assets,
- real estate,
- passive investment vehicles,
- or short-term shareholder optimization,
rather than large civilizational projects.
China historically avoided this by keeping finance more subordinated to state priorities.
The West largely subordinated states to financial markets instead.
That is one of the defining structural differences between the two systems.
Mahbubani and others from Asia often look at Europe and see a civilization that still possesses extraordinary resources but has lost confidence in using them strategically.
Whereas China projects:
- purpose,
- ambition,
- continuity,
- and belief in national destiny.
Even people who dislike China politically often recognize that psychological difference.
At the same time, Europe still has something very valuable that is easy to overlook when frustrated:
a relatively high degree of individual freedom, legal protection, intellectual openness, and social pluralism.
Those qualities can feel inefficient and chaotic — especially compared to China’s execution capacity — but they also matter deeply over long historical timescales.
The real challenge for Europe may be:
Can democratic societies recover strategic coordination and long-term thinking without abandoning openness and pluralism?
That is probably one of the hardest political questions of this century.
Historically, there is some truth to the idea that major crises can radically reset political economies and enable reforms that were previously impossible.
Postwar Japan is indeed a fascinating example.
After WWII:
- the old militarist-imperial order collapsed,
- much industrial wealth and urban infrastructure were destroyed,
- the US occupation pushed land reform and partial dismantling of the zaibatsu conglomerates,
- aristocratic structures weakened,
- and society became far more egalitarian for a period.
That restructuring helped create conditions for:
- broad education,
- industrial coordination,
- high social cohesion,
- rising middle-class prosperity,
- and national focus on productive growth.
Japan’s postwar rise was not just about technology — it was also about:
- social discipline,
- shared sacrifice,
- relatively compressed inequality,
- and alignment between state, industry, and society.
Many East Asian success stories had versions of this:
- Japan,
- South Korea,
- Taiwan,
- Singapore,
- and later China.
In different ways, they all combined:
- strategic state capacity,
- long-term industrial policy,
- high investment rates,
- and relatively cohesive national projects.
Whereas much of the contemporary West became increasingly:
- financialized,
- consumption-oriented,
- short-term,
- and fragmented politically.
That said, history also warns that crisis-driven transformation is unpredictable and dangerous.
The same crises that sometimes produce renewal can also produce:
- authoritarianism,
- scapegoating,
- collapse of trust,
- geopolitical conflict,
- or prolonged stagnation.
Europe itself experienced both possibilities in the 20th century:
- after WWI: fragmentation, extremism, fascism,
- after WWII: reconstruction, welfare states, integration.
So crisis alone is not enough.
The outcome depends on institutional resilience and leadership quality.
And one thing to be careful about with phrases like “eat the rich” is that there are multiple very different meanings hidden inside them.
There is a huge difference between:
- reducing excessive concentration of wealth,
- redirecting capital toward productive investment,
- reforming tax systems,
- limiting speculative finance,
- strengthening industrial policy,
versus destructive confiscation or political vengeance.
The successful East Asian models generally did not destroy capitalism.
They disciplined and directed it.
That’s a key distinction.
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and even China succeeded largely because they channeled capital into:
- manufacturing,
- infrastructure,
- exports,
- education,
- and technological upgrading,
rather than primarily speculative asset inflation.
Your broader frustration seems to be that Europe still has immense latent capability but lacks:
- cohesion,
- strategic direction,
- and mechanisms to align private wealth with long-term societal goals.
And many people increasingly feel this contradiction:
- society becomes more anxious and fragmented,
- while enormous pools of wealth continue compounding in globally mobile financial systems.
That can create a sense that democratic capitalism no longer serves collective civilization-building.
Historically, periods like that often do precede political realignment.
The question is whether Europe can reform gradually and intelligently —
or only under severe external pressure.
That remains very uncertain.
Exactly. That is the unresolved hinge.
Europe still has the resources, knowledge, institutions, and human capital to renew itself. What is missing is not capacity, but collective direction.
The pessimistic reading is: Europe only changes when reality becomes unbearable.
The more hopeful reading is: pressure is already accumulating, but perhaps not yet catastrophically — enough to force gradual strategic awakening around defense, energy, industry, migration, and Africa.
Maybe the real question is not whether Europe avoids crisis entirely, but whether it can turn moderate crisis into intelligent reform before it becomes severe crisis.
That is probably the narrow path.
That is very close to Mahbubani’s own worldview — and also to Lee Kuan Yew’s.
Both men repeatedly argued that civilizations decline when they become intellectually arrogant and unable to learn from others.
And historically, the West itself rose partly because it was once extraordinarily curious and adaptive:
- Renaissance Europe learned from the Islamic world,
- Britain absorbed ideas and technologies globally,
- the US learned from European science and industry,
- Meiji Japan studied Europe intensely,
- Singapore studied both Britain and East Asia,
- China studied everyone pragmatically.
The pattern is striking:
successful civilizations are often ruthless learners.
The Meiji Restoration is one of history’s greatest examples of civilizational humility combined with ambition.
Japanese elites essentially concluded:
“If we continue as we are, we will be dominated.”
So they sent missions worldwide — especially the Iwakura Mission — to study:
- railways,
- industry,
- military organization,
- banking,
- education,
- legal systems,
- shipbuilding,
- governance.
And crucially:
they did not copy blindly.
They selectively adapted Western methods while preserving Japanese continuity and identity.
That’s exactly the point you make about Lee Kuan Yew.
LKY admired many Western strengths:
- rule of law,
- meritocracy,
- science,
- administrative competence,
- capitalism,
- higher education.
But he rejected the idea that Western liberal individualism was universally applicable in the same form everywhere.
Instead Singapore developed:
- strong state capacity,
- technocratic governance,
- long-term planning,
- constrained but real capitalism,
- social discipline,
- limited political pluralism,
- and communitarian values influenced partly by Confucian traditions.
Deng Xiaoping then performed perhaps the largest-scale adaptation in human history:
- accepting markets without abandoning Party control,
- embracing capitalism without adopting Western democracy,
- integrating global trade while preserving civilizational continuity.
His genius was pragmatic flexibility:
“It doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice.”
That mindset is profoundly different from ideological rigidity.
And yes — Mahbubani’s critique of Europe is fundamentally that Europe still often assumes:
“History naturally culminates in the European liberal-democratic model.”
Whereas East Asian leaders tend to think more civilizationally and pragmatically:
- What produces order?
- Competence?
- Prosperity?
- Stability?
- Social cohesion?
- Long-term survival?
From that perspective, Europe may indeed need a period of humility and learning.
Not because East Asia is “perfect” — it clearly has its own problems:
- aging populations,
- pressure on freedoms,
- intense social conformity,
- demographic collapse in some countries,
- geopolitical tensions,
- elite control risks.
But East Asia has undeniably demonstrated strengths in:
- strategic planning,
- education,
- infrastructure,
- industrial policy,
- state competence,
- long-term orientation,
- and societal discipline.
And Europe may have become too intellectually closed to learning from non-Western models because it still unconsciously sees itself as the universal template.
That may now be changing slowly.
You can already see Europeans beginning to ask questions they rarely asked 20 years ago:
- Why can’t we build infrastructure quickly?
- Why are our energy systems so fragile?
- Why has industrial policy become taboo?
- Why can’t democracies think long-term?
- Why are Asian education systems outperforming ours?
- Why does Europe struggle to execute strategically?
Those are signs of a civilization beginning to doubt some of its assumptions.
The challenge, though, is delicate.
Europe cannot simply “become Singapore” or “become China.”
Its history, scale, culture, and political traditions are radically different.
The real question is whether Europe can learn selectively and intelligently:
- more strategic planning without authoritarianism,
- more state capacity without losing liberty,
- more long-term thinking without abandoning democracy,
- more civilizational confidence without nationalism.
That is probably the hardest balancing act imaginable.
But historically, civilizations that stop learning are usually the ones that stagnate first.
Bart De Wever is actually an interesting example of exactly the kind of intellectual current we’ve been discussing.
Whatever one thinks of his politics, he is unusual in Western Europe because he:
- thinks historically,
- thinks civilizationally,
- admires competence and state capacity,
- and is willing to study non-Western success models seriously.
That already distinguishes him from many European politicians whose worldview remains mostly confined to:
- domestic coalition management,
- moral signaling,
- or short-term electoral cycles.
His admiration for Singapore and East Asia reflects something deeper:
a respect for societies that managed to combine:
- order,
- education,
- meritocracy,
- long-term planning,
- and economic dynamism.
And like Lee Kuan Yew, De Wever tends to distrust naive ideological universalism.
He prefers:
- realism,
- cultural continuity,
- institutional competence,
- and pragmatic adaptation.
That’s one reason some people find him intellectually refreshing even when they disagree with him politically.
But you also point to the exact limitation.
Leaders who think in “hard realism” terms often risk:
- sounding cold,
- underestimating symbolic politics,
- or appearing morally ambiguous in moments where publics expect clearer ethical positioning.
The Russia issue is a good example.
Many European realists historically argued:
- Russia’s security concerns should be acknowledged,
- Europe should avoid escalation,
- geopolitical compromise is sometimes necessary.
After the invasion of Ukraine, however, public opinion shifted dramatically because many Europeans saw:
- naked aggression,
- revisionism,
- and existential threat to European order.
In that atmosphere, anything resembling “appeasement” became politically toxic.
And this highlights a broader problem for pragmatic realist thinkers in democracies:
they often communicate in terms of:
- balance of power,
- incentives,
- historical forces,
- strategic compromise,
while publics respond much more emotionally to:
- morality,
- identity,
- solidarity,
- outrage,
- and symbolic clarity.
Lee Kuan Yew operated in a very different environment:
- small city-state,
- highly centralized governance,
- existential vulnerability,
- relatively technocratic political culture.
Europe is vastly more fragmented and emotionally pluralistic.
So someone like De Wever can influence intellectual debates strongly, but becoming a broadly pan-European figure is much harder because:
- Europe is suspicious of strong realism,
- national histories differ enormously,
- and sharp intellectual honesty can alienate as many voters as it attracts.
Still, I think you are noticing something real:
there is a slowly growing appetite in Europe for leaders who appear:
- serious,
- historically literate,
- strategically minded,
- and less trapped in ideological clichés.
The success of East Asia has forced many Europeans to reconsider assumptions that once felt unquestionable.
And figures like De Wever, Macron, some Nordic strategists, certain German industrial thinkers, and even parts of the EU technocratic sphere are all — in different ways — reacting to that shift:
the realization that Europe may need more realism, competence, and long-term strategic thinking to remain viable in the 21st century.
The difficulty is finding a version of that realism that:
- remains democratic,
- avoids cynicism,
- avoids authoritarian drift,
- and still inspires broad public trust.
That balancing act is extraordinarily hard.
That impulse — to connect serious long-term thinkers across ideological and national boundaries — is probably more important than it first appears.
Because one of Europe’s deepest problems right now is fragmentation of strategic thought.
People who worry about:
- demographic decline,
- state capacity,
- industrial strategy,
- migration,
- Africa,
- energy,
- education,
- civilizational confidence,
- and geopolitical realism
often exist in isolated silos:
- academics,
- business leaders,
- mayors,
- technocrats,
- diplomats,
- military strategists,
- industrialists,
- philosophers,
- policy thinkers.
Meanwhile highly networked activist ecosystems already exist on both the populist right and progressive left.
What’s often missing is a broad strategic realist network that is:
- intellectually serious,
- future-oriented,
- democratic,
- pragmatic,
- and capable of translating diagnosis into institution-building.
And historically, major transformations often begin exactly this way:
small circles of intellectually aligned people who:
- read each other,
- meet repeatedly,
- build trust,
- formulate coherent narratives,
- create think tanks,
- influence media,
- enter institutions,
- and gradually shape elite consensus.
That’s how:
- the neoliberal movement spread after WWII,
- European integration evolved,
- environmental politics emerged,
- neoconservatism spread in the US,
- and East Asian developmental-state models were refined.
The first phase is usually not mass politics.
It is network formation among intellectually serious people.
And honestly, Europe may increasingly need:
- engineers,
- industrial leaders,
- urbanists,
- demographers,
- geopolitical strategists,
- philosophers,
- economists,
- and technologically literate policymakers
to begin thinking together again at a civilizational level.
Because the current political discourse is often too reactive and fragmented for problems of this scale.
What’s interesting is that there are already partially overlapping circles:
- strategic autonomy thinkers in France,
- industrial policy advocates in Germany,
- Nordic resilience and governance experts,
- urban planners inspired by Singapore,
- demographic realists,
- military strategists,
- certain EU technocrats,
- some business leaders worried about long-term competitiveness,
- and intellectuals influenced by Mahbubani, LKY, or East Asian governance models.
But they are not yet unified into a coherent movement or narrative.
And there’s another important point:
if such a network emerges, it would probably succeed only if it avoids becoming:
- ideological,
- tribal,
- anti-democratic,
- or nostalgic.
The real opportunity would be something more like:
a European renewal movement centered on competence, realism, long-term thinking, and institutional capability.
Not copying China.
Not abandoning democracy.
But learning strategically from civilizations that still think in decades rather than news cycles.
And importantly:
Europe does not need to become authoritarian to become more strategic.
For example, Europe could potentially strengthen:
- industrial policy,
- infrastructure execution,
- strategic investment banks,
- long-term energy planning,
- educational excellence,
- civil service meritocracy,
- regional development,
- and African partnerships
while remaining pluralistic and democratic.
The challenge is cultural and organizational:
how do you create enough coherence and confidence to sustain such policies over time?
Your instinct about “assembling people” is historically significant because ideas only become forces when networks form around them.
A book alone changes little.
A coordinated ecosystem can gradually reshape institutions.
If you genuinely want to explore this direction intellectually, you might find it worthwhile to map:
- thinkers,
- politicians,
- economists,
- journals,
- conferences,
- think tanks,
- and business leaders
who share aspects of this worldview.
Not because they all agree — they won’t —
but because they may share:
- strategic realism,
- concern about European stagnation,
- admiration for competence,
- and willingness to learn from non-Western models.
That kind of map itself can become clarifying.
Fair point — I did have actual currents and some concrete people in mind, though this “network” is still diffuse and not formally organized. The people below do not all agree politically, but they overlap around themes like:
- strategic realism,
- state capacity,
- industrial policy,
- civilizational confidence,
- long-term thinking,
- skepticism toward naive globalization,
- and learning from East Asia.
France / European Strategic Autonomy
Emmanuel Macron
Not a theorist in the deep philosophical sense, but probably the most important mainstream European politician articulating:
- European strategic autonomy,
- industrial sovereignty,
- geopolitical realism,
- and civilizational Europe.
He increasingly sounds closer to a Gaullist + Singaporean realist hybrid than a classic liberal technocrat.
Bruno Maçães (Portuguese)
Former Portuguese Europe minister and one of the most interesting European geopolitical thinkers today.
Books:
- The Dawn of Eurasia
- History Has Begun
He argues Europe must stop assuming it is the center of history and understand the emerging Eurasian/Asian order.
Very influenced by observing China and Asia directly.
Luuk van Middelaar (Dutch)
Important EU intellectual and historian.
Writes about:
- Europe as a geopolitical actor,
- crisis-driven integration,
- statecraft,
- strategic action.
Less East-Asia focused explicitly, but strongly concerned with Europe becoming strategically capable again.
Germany – industrial and strategic thinkers
Germany is fascinating because many industrial elites quietly understand the China challenge far better than public discourse suggests.
Wolfgang Münchau
German economic journalist and thinker.
Very critical of:
- German complacency,
- deindustrialization,
- energy mistakes,
- and Europe’s strategic weakness.
Book:
- Kaput: The End of the German Miracle
He argues Europe must rediscover industrial realism.
Ulrike Malmendier
German economist (Berkeley, advisory roles in Germany).
Interesting on:
- long-term institutional behavior,
- economic psychology,
- state competence.
Not ideological, but part of the broader “serious strategic governance” current.
Harald Welzer
German sociologist/philosopher.
Concerned with:
- societal resilience,
- sustainability,
- social cohesion,
- civilizational adaptation.
More ecological than industrial, but important in strategic-cultural discussions.
Sigmar Gabriel
Former German vice-chancellor.
Increasingly vocal about:
- industrial policy,
- China realism,
- European sovereignty,
- strategic economic interests.
Represents the older German industrial-state tradition.
German industrial ecosystem itself
Honestly, some of the most strategic thinking in Europe happens quietly inside:
- Mittelstand networks,
- industrial federations,
- engineering circles,
- export-oriented firms.
Many German industrial leaders deeply admire:
- Singapore,
- Korea,
- Japan,
- and aspects of China’s long-term planning.
Even when they would never say so publicly in simplistic terms.
Nordic thinkers / strategists
The Nordics are interesting because they combine:
- high trust,
- state competence,
- realism,
- technological sophistication,
- and long-term planning culture.
Carl Bildt (Sweden)
Former Swedish PM and foreign minister.
Very sharp geopolitical thinker.
Strong on:
- Europe’s strategic positioning,
- technology,
- geopolitics,
- global power shifts.
More Atlanticist than Mahbubani, but intellectually serious and globally aware.
Parag Khanna (not Nordic, but Singapore-based and highly influential in these circles)
Indian-origin geopolitical thinker living in Singapore.
Books:
- The Future is Asian
- Move
- Connectography
Very aligned with the idea that Europe must learn from Asia’s infrastructural and strategic mindset.
Strong Singapore influence.
Janan Ganesh (UK/Indian background)
FT columnist.
Very perceptive about:
- elite dysfunction,
- state capacity,
- comparative governance,
- Western stagnation.
Frequently contrasts Western paralysis with Asian competence.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Denmark)
Former NATO chief.
More security-oriented, but part of the Nordic realist tradition:
- resilience,
- institutional competence,
- strategic awareness.
Swedish/Finnish total-defense strategists
There’s an entire Nordic ecosystem around:
- resilience,
- preparedness,
- societal trust,
- technological sovereignty,
- long-term state planning.
Finland especially is admired quietly across Europe for:
- serious governance,
- education,
- resilience culture,
- strategic realism toward Russia.
Singapore / Asia-linked thinkers Europeans should study
Kishore Mahbubani
Obviously central.
Books:
- Has China Won?
- The Asian 21st Century
- The Great Convergence
Lee Kuan Yew
Still essential reading.
Especially:
- From Third World to First
- The Singapore Story
Not because Singapore can be copied, but because of:
- civilizational realism,
- anti-ideological pragmatism,
- statecraft,
- strategic adaptation.
Zhang Weiwei
Chinese intellectual arguing for:
- civilizational-state thinking,
- non-Western modernization,
- pragmatic governance.
Worth reading even if one disagrees.
Zheng Yongnian
Chinese/Singapore-based political scholar.
Very serious analyst of:
- Chinese governance,
- state capacity,
- modernization models.
Europe-adjacent “state capacity” thinkers
Mariana Mazzucato
Very influential on:
- mission-oriented state investment,
- industrial strategy,
- innovation policy.
Closer to progressive economics, but highly relevant.
Mark Leonard (ECFR)
European strategic thinker.
Concerned with:
- Europe’s geopolitical weakness,
- strategic autonomy,
- global system change.
Ivan Krastev (Bulgaria)
One of Europe’s sharpest political analysts.
Writes brilliantly about:
- European fragmentation,
- post-liberal Europe,
- demographic anxiety,
- identity politics.
The bigger pattern
The important thing is less individual personalities and more the emerging convergence:
Across Europe, different people are independently rediscovering:
- geopolitics,
- industrial policy,
- state competence,
- long-term planning,
- demographic realism,
- infrastructure,
- and civilizational thinking.
That is historically significant.
Because from the 1990s to roughly 2015, many European elites genuinely believed:
economics, markets, and liberal norms would gradually solve geopolitical problems automatically.
That worldview is now eroding.
What comes next is still unclear.
But you are sensing a real intellectual transition underway.
