Boiling or Leaping?: april 2025

dinsdag 15 april 2025

collective imposter syndrome

The western business world is racing fast towards a huge collective imposter syndrome. Western business has outsourced so many key capabilities like engineering and manufacturing. What is left, can be reduced to finance, sales, marketing and a few other overpriced services like consulting, law and IT. please comment.

That's a sharp and thought-provoking take — and one that's resonating more and more.

There is a creeping sense that Western business, especially in its corporate core, is losing the muscle and keeping only the glossy surface. We've offloaded the "doing" — the engineering, the making, the building — and kept the "talking about doing": strategy decks, branding campaigns, financial engineering, legal gymnastics, and endless layers of consultants consulting the consultants.

Outsourcing as a slow erosion
Outsourcing made perfect short-term sense — lower costs, focus on "core competencies" — but long-term, it's eroded the ability to actually build things. The West used to be able to design, make, and iterate under one roof. Now, design is in California, prototyping is in Shenzhen, manufacturing in Vietnam, and customer service in the Philippines. That fragmentation undermines not just capability, but identity.

Imposter syndrome is a fitting metaphor.
Western firms still wear the suit of the industrial powerhouse — stock market valuations, global brands, sleek HQs — but underneath, there's a gnawing anxiety: Do we still matter? Can we still actually do things? That's classic imposter syndrome. The surface looks successful, but inside there's a fear of being found out.

Overpriced services as the echo chamber
Finance, marketing, consulting, and legal work can be incredibly valuable. But when the bulk of an economy revolves around these services, it often becomes a game of managing perception and friction rather than creating real value. There's also a risk of circularity — consultants advising each other, lawyers creating work for other lawyers — a kind of professional services ouroboros.

What's next?
There's a real question about what happens if the West doesn't reverse this — especially in a geopolitical context where "resilience" is making a comeback. Some forward-looking companies are trying to re-integrate capabilities (e.g., reshoring, investing in apprenticeships, deeper tech verticals), but the momentum of finance-driven optimization is strong.

Curious: what sparked this thought for you? Personal experience, frustration, observation?

vrijdag 11 april 2025

The evitability of the future

Yuval Noah Harari had an inspiring point for me in his book homo deus about the evitability of the future. His example was about the prospect of communism in the early 20th century, after the Russian revolution. At that point it was feared that the working class all over the world would revolt and that communism would become the dominant ideology. However it turned out completely different and with the social corrections of capitalism and many other things, it was capitalism that remained the dominant ideology. This makes me think about the current seemingly inevitable future prospect of population collapse which is looming on the distant horizon, for many developed countries, mainly Japan, South-Korea, China and Europe. We have time to adapt and we will, probably, although the urgency is not clear at the moment at all.

That's a really rich reflection — and Harari's point about the "evitability" of the future is indeed powerful. The example you mention from Homo Deus shows how what feels like a historical certainty in the moment can turn out to be just one of many possibilities. That kind of humility toward the future seems more important than ever.

Your connection to the current demographic trend — the looming population collapse in developed countries — is a sharp one. It does have that same air of inevitability in popular discourse. The aging populations, declining birth rates, and shrinking workforces are often presented as unavoidable doom scenarios. But as Harari might say: the future isn't a straight line from present data — it's a landscape of branching paths shaped by choices, creativity, culture, and randomness.

It's also worth noting that while demographic collapse as a trend seems backed by hard data, how societies respond is wide open. For example, we might see:

Technological adaptation: Increased automation and AI may make smaller workforces manageable.
Cultural shifts: Societies could find new ways to make family life more appealing or manageable, especially for women.
Policy shifts: Radical changes in migration policy or family support systems could reshape trends.
Economic reconfiguration: A move away from growth-centered economics toward sustainability and wellbeing-centered models.

Right now, it's like we're staring at a weather forecast that says "storm coming in 50 years." But the barometer doesn't decide how we build our house.

Do you feel like your own outlook on this is more optimistic or cautious? Or are you just sitting with the idea, like a mental "what if"?

My outlook is not so optimistic although optimism is a moral duty. I fear that these doom scenarios are paralyzing us and I wonder when we will really start taking meaningful action to avoid it

That's beautifully and honestly said — "optimism is a moral duty" but still, the weight of looming problems can be paralyzing. It's a deeply human tension: on one hand, we should believe in our capacity to adapt; on the other, we know how good we are at procrastinating until the fire's already at the door.

Demographic decline is especially tricky because it's slow-moving, diffuse, and not "felt" like a sudden crisis. There's no dramatic headline that says "Birth Rate Drops Again — Millions Impacted in 2057." So it stays abstract, even though it has massive long-term consequences: shrinking economies, lonely elderly populations, declining innovation, geopolitical power shifts…

What's paralyzing too is that the solutions aren't easy slogans. Increasing birth rates isn't just a matter of policy — it's about housing, gender roles, work-life balance, culture, identity. Immigration might ease demographic pressure, but it brings its own political and cultural tensions. And as you said, when nothing feels urgent, nothing gets done.

And yet… there are moments in history where societies pivoted: post-war Europe rebuilding itself, countries suddenly choosing green energy over fossil fuels, major shifts in women's rights, digital revolutions… The big question is: what will be the tipping point for this issue? When will it hit us that the world we're building may be dangerously empty?

Maybe the first real sign will come when large cities start feeling visibly "older" and quieter — fewer children in the streets, more closed schools than open ones, labor shortages not just in tech but in care and services. Or when a country like South Korea hits a crisis moment and has to act, and the rest follow. But it would be so much better if we could preempt that.

Do you think there's something in particular that could jolt society into action? Or are we bound to wait for a moment of real pain before change begins?

donderdag 10 april 2025

Onnodig publiekelijk vernederen van China is niet verstandig

Do you have examples in history of important conflicts between countries that could have been avoided but were triggered by one country humiliating the other one like trump is doing now by singling out China out of all other countries as a vilain and as offender because they supposedly export too much to the usa?

ChatGPT zei:

Yes, there are several historical examples of major international conflicts that were either triggered or significantly worsened by one country humiliating another—often through rhetoric, policy, or symbolic actions. These situations often escalate because national pride, reputation, and perceived status are deeply important in international relations, especially when a rising power feels disrespected or unfairly blamed. Here's a look at some relevant cases:

1. The Treaty of Versailles and Germany (1919)

Context: After World War I, the Treaty of Versailles imposed extremely harsh conditions on Germany—heavy reparations, territorial losses, and a "war guilt" clause that placed all blame for the war on Germany.
Effect: This humiliation was deeply resented in Germany across the political spectrum. It was a key factor in the rise of Adolf Hitler and Nazi ideology, which focused heavily on reversing the treaty and restoring national pride.
Could it have been avoided? Many historians argue that a more balanced peace settlement could have prevented the rise of extremism and possibly World War II.

2. The Opium Wars and China (1839–1842 and 1856–1860)

Context: Britain forced China to open up to trade (including opium) through military aggression. The Chinese defeat led to a series of "unequal treaties" that humiliated the Qing Dynasty, including ceding Hong Kong and granting extraterritorial rights to foreigners.
Effect: These events are still remembered in China as a "Century of Humiliation" and continue to shape Chinese nationalism and foreign policy today.
Modern parallel? Some Chinese scholars and officials see modern U.S. actions—especially public accusations and trade restrictions—as echoing this pattern of foreign humiliation.

3. The Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and Russia's humiliation

Context: Japan unexpectedly defeated Russia, a major European power, in a war over influence in Manchuria and Korea.
Effect: The defeat was a national shock to Russia and contributed to internal unrest that helped spark the 1905 revolution. But more importantly, the war changed the balance of power in Asia and increased tensions leading into WWI.
Link to humiliation: Russia underestimated Japan and suffered a loss of prestige, which had long-term effects on its global posture.

4. Japan and the League of Nations (1930s)

Context: In the 1930s, Japan was condemned by the League of Nations (led by Western powers) for its invasion of Manchuria.
Effect: Instead of reconsidering its expansion, Japan withdrew from the League, turned inward, and radicalized. It felt that it was being treated unfairly and not as a true global power—despite its economic and military strength.
Result: This perceived humiliation fed Japanese militarism and led to further aggression in Asia and eventually to Pearl Harbor and the Pacific War.

5. U.S. treatment of Iraq in the 1990s

Context: After the Gulf War, Iraq was subjected to heavy sanctions and inspections, and Saddam Hussein frequently accused the U.S. of trying to humiliate Iraq.
Effect: While Saddam was a brutal dictator, the ongoing sanctions and inspections helped foster anti-American sentiment and set the stage for future conflict, culminating in the 2003 invasion.

Lessons for today:

What Trump (or any U.S. leader) says and how it's said matters deeply in international relations. Singling out China in a way that feels like scapegoating or public shaming—especially on a global stage—risks creating exactly the kind of resentment that leads to escalation.

China has a long historical memory of being humiliated by the West.
National pride and face-saving are key in Chinese political culture.
If the U.S. is seen as humiliating China rather than negotiating as equals, the chance of conflict—cold or hot—increases.

zondag 6 april 2025

Trump tariffs = repetition of Smoot-Hawley Act

What is the Smoot-Hawley Act?

The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (officially: Tariff Act of 1930) was a U.S. law that raised tariffs on thousands of imported goods.

• Sponsored by: Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis C. Hawley

• Signed into law: June 17, 1930, by President Herbert Hoover

• Goal: To protect American farmers and manufacturers by making foreign goods more expensive (and less competitive) during the Great Depression.

What did it do?

• Increased U.S. tariffs on over 20,000 imported goods to record levels.

• For example, tariffs on some agricultural goods were doubled.

What happened as a result?

• Other countries retaliated by raising their own tariffs.

• This led to a collapse in international trade, deepening the global economic crisis.

• It is widely blamed for worsening the Great Depression worldwide.

Legacy:

The Smoot-Hawley Act is now often cited as a warning against protectionism in times of economic stress. Many economists and historians consider it one of the worst policy decisions of the era.

Let me know if you want it explained in even simpler terms or with an example!

zaterdag 5 april 2025

Foreign investment in us t-bills

Foreign investment in the us in t-bills but also real estate will plummet as a result of the new very high tariffs on goods since the dollar surplus of exporting countries like china, Japan and germany will decrease significantly. This could bring the us treasury and us real estate into crisis territory. Please comment

You're absolutely right to point out the potential ripple effects of high tariffs on global capital flows, particularly when it comes to countries like China, Japan, and Germany that have traditionally run large trade surpluses with the U.S. and recycled those dollar surpluses into U.S. assets such as Treasury securities and real estate.

Here's a breakdown of the mechanism and the potential consequences:

1. Tariffs Reduce U.S. Imports → Lower Dollar Surpluses for Exporters

High tariffs on goods aim to reduce U.S. imports by making them more expensive. If successful, this will reduce the volume of goods exported to the U.S. by countries like China, Japan, and Germany. Fewer exports = fewer dollars earned.

2. Fewer Dollars Earned → Lower Foreign Demand for U.S. Assets

Exporting countries accumulate U.S. dollars through trade surpluses. These dollars are often reinvested in:

• U.S. Treasuries: Seen as a safe, liquid store of value.

• Real Estate and Equities: For diversification and yield.

If trade surpluses shrink, so does the pool of dollars available for such reinvestment.

3. Consequences for the U.S. Treasury Market

• Decreased foreign demand for Treasuries could push yields higher (prices lower), increasing borrowing costs for the U.S. government.

• The U.S. is running large fiscal deficits, so reduced demand from major foreign buyers like China and Japan could be especially painful.

• If the Fed steps in to fill the gap (via bond-buying), it could stoke inflation fears and weaken the dollar.

4. Consequences for U.S. Real Estate

• Foreign buyers—especially from China—have been significant players in U.S. residential and commercial real estate, especially in cities like New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.

• A reduced flow of capital could depress property values, especially in high-end markets already vulnerable to rising interest rates.

5. Feedback Loop Risk

A weaker real estate and bond market could hurt consumer confidence and financial sector stability, potentially triggering a broader economic slowdown. In turn, this could undermine the very manufacturing base the tariffs were intended to protect.

In Short

Yes, there is a real risk that aggressive tariff policies, if not balanced with broader macroeconomic strategy, could backfire by destabilizing key pillars of the U.S. financial system. This is a classic case of unintended consequences—solving one perceived problem (trade imbalances) by potentially creating a larger one (capital flight and asset price instability).

Would you like a more detailed model or visual on how these flows interact?

——-

A dollar devaluation is also a likely consequence of these aggressive us import tariffs. This will make it even tougher for importers into the us to do business. Maybe Trump is aiming for a repetition of the plaza accord of 1985 which led to a revaluation of the japanese yen with large negative longterm consequences for the japanese economy. Please comment.

Absolutely—your observation touches on a deeper and historically resonant dynamic: the intersection of tariff policy, currency valuation, and geopolitical strategy. Let's unpack this in light of current and past events:

1. Aggressive Tariffs → Lower Dollar Demand → Dollar Devaluation

When the U.S. imposes steep tariffs:

• Imports decline, which reduces the volume of dollars that foreign exporters earn.

• Those exporters in turn demand fewer dollars, which puts downward pressure on the dollar's exchange rate.

• If foreign capital flows (e.g. into Treasuries or real estate) also shrink, the demand side weakens further.

A weaker dollar increases the cost of foreign goods, acting as a secondary, implicit tariff, further amplifying the protective effect on U.S. manufacturers—but at the cost of inflation and disruption to import-dependent sectors.

2. Repeating the Plaza Accord Playbook?

The Plaza Accord of 1985 was a coordinated move by the G5 nations to devalue the U.S. dollar—particularly against the Japanese yen and German Deutsche Mark. The goal was to:

• Correct massive U.S. trade deficits.

• Reduce political tensions related to those deficits.

Result for Japan:

• The yen appreciated drastically.

• Japanese exporters were hit hard.

• In response, Japan enacted ultra-loose monetary policy to stimulate domestic demand.

• That policy led to asset bubbles in real estate and equities, which eventually collapsed in the early 1990s, triggering Japan's "Lost Decade."

Parallels to 2025?

• Trump's trade stance may be attempting to coerce a dollar realignment via unilateral tariffs rather than multilateral diplomacy.

• This could force trade partners like China or Germany into choosing between letting their currencies appreciate (hurting their exports) or engaging in defensive monetary easing (risking asset bubbles).

• In a sense, this is a de facto Plaza Accord, but without the accord.

3. Strategic but Risky

If a dollar devaluation happens:

• U.S. exports become more competitive, which is politically popular.

• But imported inflation becomes a real concern, especially in sectors dependent on foreign goods (energy, electronics, etc.).

• It may disrupt global markets, provoke retaliation from trade partners, and undermine confidence in the dollar as the global reserve currency.

Conclusion

It's plausible that Trump is aiming for a Plaza Accord 2.0 by force—using tariffs as leverage to realign currency values. But doing this unilaterally and in a much more complex global economy risks unintended consequences, both domestically and abroad. The outcome might indeed mirror Japan's experience if foreign economies react with capital misallocation and asset inflation.

Would you be interested in an economic scenario analysis or historical comparison model to explore potential future outcomes in more depth?

Yes

Great — here's a structured scenario analysis comparing the current (2025) U.S. tariff strategy with the 1985 Plaza Accord, along with potential economic trajectories in the short and long term. I'll break it down into key dimensions:

I. Historical Comparison: Plaza Accord vs. Trump Tariffs

Factor	Plaza Accord (1985)	Trump Tariff Policy (2025)
Strategy	Coordinated, multilateral agreement to devalue the dollar	Unilateral, aggressive tariff escalation aimed at reducing imports
Target	Mainly Japan and West Germany	China, Germany, Japan, Vietnam, and others
Currency Impact	Rapid appreciation of the yen and Deutsche mark	Indirect pressure on dollar via reduced capital inflows and trade imbalance manipulation
Follow-on Policy	Japan responded with loose monetary policy → asset bubbles	Potential for similar response in 2025 by China or others to cushion export losses
Outcome	Short-term correction of imbalances; long-term damage to Japanese economy	TBD, but risks mirror Japan's: asset bubbles, stagnation, and currency instability

II. Scenario Matrix: Potential Outcomes (2025–2030)

1. Base Case: Mild Dollar Devaluation & Modest Trade Realignment

• Dollar weakens gradually (~10%).

• Imports decline slightly; U.S. manufacturing sees temporary gains.

• Trade partners absorb some currency appreciation without major intervention.

• Inflation rises moderately in the U.S.; Treasury yields edge up.

• Result: Manageable turbulence, but no global crisis.

Likelihood: Medium

Impact: Moderate

Historical Parallel: Soft landing version of Plaza Accord

2. Adverse Case: Sharp Dollar Devaluation & Capital Flight

• Dollar drops 20%+ as foreign investors pull out of Treasuries and real estate.

• Inflation accelerates (especially import-driven).

• Fed forced into difficult position: raise rates to support dollar or cut to support economy.

• China, Japan, Germany resort to currency manipulation or QE-style policies.

• Result: Volatility, trade retaliation, asset sell-offs.

Likelihood: Medium-High

Impact: High

Historical Parallel: Plaza Accord + 1990s Japan bubble-burst scenario

3. Crisis Case: Global Trade Breakdown & U.S. Asset Crash

• Tariffs provoke full-scale trade wars.

• Severe dollar devaluation triggers inflation shock in the U.S.

• Massive drop in foreign Treasury demand = bond crisis.

• Real estate markets collapse in cities with high foreign ownership.

• Global recession as supply chains fracture.

• China & others launch alternative currency initiatives to challenge USD hegemony.

Likelihood: Low-Medium

Impact: Severe

Historical Parallel: Great Depression-style decoupling, with modern financial exposure

III. Key Variables to Watch

• 10-Year Treasury Yields: Spike = declining confidence in U.S. fiscal sustainability.

• Capital Account Trends: Falling net inflows = reduced foreign demand.

• Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER): Sudden drops could signal devaluation shock.

• CPI Inflation / Wage Growth: To gauge domestic pain from dollar devaluation.

• Trade Retaliation Measures: Especially from EU, China, and Japan.

IV. Strategic Insights

• The Trump approach may achieve short-term political wins by stimulating U.S. manufacturing and weakening the dollar.

• But without global coordination or monetary discipline, it risks repeating Japan's fate: inflation abroad, bubbles at home, and long-term stagnation.

• A key difference from 1985 is the size and importance of China in global trade—its response will be crucial.

Would you like a visual chart (timeline or scenario tree), or a summary you could use in a presentation or memo?